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ABSTRACT 
CUSTOMER’S INVENTORY ACCRUALS AND SUPPLIER’S EARNINGS 
QUALITY 
by 
Fok Cheuk Kwong 
Master of Philosophy 
We examine the influence of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s accounting 
quality and earnings management practices.  We consider two views of the role of 
customer’s inventory accruals play on their supplier and how they relate to their 
financial reporting. The first is the customer’s inventory accruals reflect supplier’s 
earnings management (i.e., intentional bias) as well as lead to difficulty in supplier’s 
earnings estimation (i.e., unintentional errors).  The second view is based on supplier’s 
information advantage theory, which suggests suppliers are capable to interpret the 
information content of customer’s inventory accruals. In contrast to the information 
advantage view, we find that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory 
accruals have lower earnings quality and engage in more earnings management, even 
after controlling for their own inventory accruals level. 
Key words: inventory accruals, financial reporting, earnings quality, earnings 
management, supply chain  
DECLARATION 
 I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, 
and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have 
been duly acknowledged. 
       Fok Cheuk Kwong 
       Date:
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS 
CUSTOMER'S INVENTORY ACCRUALS AND 
SUPPLIER'S EARNINGS QUALITY 
by 
FOK Cheuk Kwong 
Master of Philosophy 
Panel of Examiners 
.,� 
( of. WONG Shiu 
��-
•�-·­
.,.,._
(Prof. SHANG Weixin) 
Chief Supervisor 
Prof. LIU Liming 
Co-supervisor 
Prof. CHAN Koon Hung 
(Chairman) 
(External Member) 
(Internal Member) 
(Internal Member) 
Approved for the
·�
f � _l 
(Prof. MOK Ka Ho Joshua) 
Chairman, Postgraduate Studies Committee 
2 0 AUG 2019 
Date 
i 
Table of Content 
Table of Content .............................................................................................................. i 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
2. Hypotheses Development and Related Research ......................................................... 5 
3. Research Design ......................................................................................................... 10 
4.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 13 
5. Empirical Findings ..................................................................................................... 15 
6. Additional Analyses ................................................................................................... 20 
6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 23 
References ...................................................................................................................... 24 
Appendix 1 ..................................................................................................................... 27 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................... 28 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix............................................................................................. 29 
Table 3 Relation between Customer’s Weighted Invetory Accruals and Proxies of 
Earnings Quality ............................................................................................................ 30 
Table 4 Relation between Changes of Customer’s Weighted Abnormal Inventory and 
Proxies of Earnings Quality ........................................................................................... 31 
Table 5 IV ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 6 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Proxies of Earnings Quality (Using 
an Alternate Proxy for Abnormal inventory .................................................................. 33 
ii 
 
Table 7 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Earnings Quality (F-score and ICW)
 34 
Table 8 Additional Control Variables ............................................................................ 35 
 
ACKNOWLEGMENTS 
I thank my supervisors Prof. Liming Liu and Prof. Koon Hung Chan for their excellent 
supervisions. I appreciate the great research training provided by Prof. Mary E. Barth, 
Dr. Michael Chau, Prof. Igor Goncharov, Prof. Martin Glaum, Prof. Kai Wai Hui, Prof. 
Mingyi Hung, Prof. Wayne R. Landsman, Dr. Hsiao-Hui Lee, Prof. Ji-Chai Lin, Prof. 
Tse-Chun Lin, Prof. Jeffrey Ng, Prof. James Ohlson, Dr. Yaxuan Qi, Dr. Albert Tsang, 
Prof. Echo Wan, Prof. Junbo Wang, Dr. Xin Wang, Prof. Steven Young, Prof. 
Guochang Zhang and Prof. Kevin Zhou through the Cross-Institutional Course 
Enrolment Scheme and the 8th WHU Doctoral Summer Program in Accounting 
Research. I am very grateful to the insightful comments from Prof. John R. Birge, Prof. 
Xin Chang, Dr. Weixin Shang, Dr. Jing Wu, Prof. Huai Zhang and seminar participants 
at the Tenth POMS-HK International Conference and MSOM Conference 2019. I also 
thank Mr. Wai Ho Chan for his technical support.
1 
CUSTOMER’S INVENTORY ACCRUALS AND SUPPLIER’S EARNINGS 
QUALITY 
1. Introduction
“Thomas and Zhang (2002) … find that inventory accruals exhibit the most robust 
relation with future stock returns … it is likely due to both the economic magnitude of 
inventory accruals and the reluctance of managers to write down inventory in the face of 
slowing demand.”  
(Dechow et al. 2011) 
We investigate the influence of the economic magnitude of customer’s inventory 
accruals on supplier’s earnings quality. An instrumental paper of Sloan (1996) show that 
the quality of the accrual component of earnings is lower than that of cash flow component. 
Further, Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that change in inventory is the most important 
component of accrual estimation error. Recently, Allen et al. (2013) indicate that inventory 
accruals lead to lower earnings quality due to measurement error caused by the write-
downs of inventory.  Although inventory accrual is an important determinant of earnings 
quality, it is unclear that whether inventory accruals of one firm exhibit externalities and 
affect the earnings quality of their economically-related counterparties, i.e. suppliers. 
Meanwhile, Operations Management literature document that customer’s excess 
inventory news is associated with negative short windows stock returns of their suppliers 
(Hendricks and Singhal 2009). Accordingly, inventory management and its impacts along 
the supply chain are focused by the industry participants. For example, Home Depot Inc. 
draws media attention by adopting lean inventory management (Ziobro, 2016) and 
Walmart are blamed by attaining better inventory management through passing the costs 
on to their suppliers (Nuzio, 2019).  Recent works in accounting demonstrate the role of 
customers/suppliers on a firm’s accounting practices (Raman and Shahrur 2008, Hui et al. 
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2012). We extend this stream of studies by testing how, if at all, inventory accruals which 
reside in the downstream customers influence the supplier’s accounting quality and 
earnings management behavior. 
We consider two views of the influence of customer’s inventory accruals on the 
supplier’s earnings quality. The first view is based on the notion that inventory buildup at 
downstream customer reflects both intentional and unintentional estimation errors. An 
increase in customer’s inventory accruals is a signal that supplier is engaged in real 
earnings management through channel stuffing. To elaborate, suppliers may inflate their 
earnings/sales by loading excessive inventory to its customers than they are capable of 
selling. However, customers will return unsold inventory in the future and associated 
revenues of suppliers will not be realized. The inflated earnings achieved by real earnings 
management will probably reverse in the future, lead to lower persistence of earnings and 
poor accounting quality. Second, customer’s inventory accruals cause unintentional errors 
in earnings estimation since it is more difficult for supplier to predict an uncertain future, 
or just because measurement error related to the inventory write-downs. Prior research in 
operation management (e.g. Steinker and Hoberg 2013) suggest that inventory level 
signals either expected higher future demand or sales fall below expectations. Moreover, 
the demand uncertainty propagates to upstream suppliers in an amplified form by the 
bullwhip effect (Bray and Mendelson 2012). For example, when supplier (the announcing 
firm) announces the excess inventory news about its customers, the negative market 
reaction is more serious than when the excess inventory is about the announcing firm 
directly (Hendricks and Singhal 2009). The demand uncertainty coupled with the bullwhip 
effect may raise difficulty for supplier firms to estimate earnings and provide high quality 
financial statements. 
3 
An alternative view suggests that suppliers, especially those who operate in closely 
related lines of business of their customers, are capable to access to customer’s superior 
information and promote a more accurate estimation in future prospects and earnings. This 
view is predicated on the supplier extending trade credits to their customers and its 
information advantage beyond financial intermediaries can reduce information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (information advantage hypothesis). Petersen 
and Rajan (1997) document that suppliers extend trade credit to even loss-making 
customers when suppliers predict these customers have high growth potential in the future. 
Intuitively, suppliers gather private information from customers during the ordinary 
course of business and they are able to differentiate different business conditions signaled 
by customer’s inventory accruals. In other words, customer’s inventory accruals and 
supplier’s private information pieced together as “mosaic” and provide additional 
information for suppliers to estimate earnings. Thus, we attempt to answer the empirical 
question if customer’s inventory accruals level affect supplier’s earnings quality. 
Following prior literature (e.g. Thomas and Zhang 2002, Allen et al. 2013), we employ 
changes in inventory over average total assets as the measure of inventory accruals.  Our 
final sample includes 7,950 firms in Compustat Segment database. To address potential 
problems related to omitted variables, we control for supplier’s own inventory accruals 
level. 
We examine the impact of customer’s inventory accruals using two measures of 
earnings quality and a measure of financial misstatement.  In each case, we control for 
related determinants of earnings quality identified in the prior literature. Our findings are 
consistent with customer’s inventory accruals exerting a significant negative influence on 
supplier firms' earnings management and earnings quality, instead of a positive causal 
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relation. In particular, we find that higher level of customer’s inventory accruals leads to 
poorer supplier’s earnings quality measured by the standard deviation of residuals derived 
from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and the absolute magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. Moreover, we show that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory 
accruals exhibit a higher tendency of a financial misstatement as measured by “fraud score” 
(Fscore) (Dechow et al., 2011). Thus, we conclude that customer’s inventory accruals 
level is a significantly negative determinant of supplier’s earnings quality. 
We employ numerous additional analyses to evaluate the robustness of the main 
results.  First, we use the change specification to examine how the change in customer’s 
inventory accruals affect the change in supplier’s earnings quality. Second, we use an 
instrumental variables analysis to address potential endogeneity concern.  Third, we 
followed Roychowdhury (2006) to add the change in LIFO reserve to inventory accruals 
as an alternative measure to account for the differences caused by first-in, first-out (FIFO) 
versus last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory valuation methods. Taken as a whole, the results 
continue to cast doubt on the supplier’s informational advantage and favor the difficulty 
in earnings estimation view.  In no case do we find higher customer’s inventory accruals 
level cause higher supplier’s accounting quality or less likelihood of a financial 
misstatement.  
Our paper adds to the contemporary accounting literature in numerous directions. First, 
this study highlights that high level of customer’s inventory accruals harms supplier firms’ 
financial reporting quality.  Although some studies try to investigate the causal relation 
between the role of inventory accruals and earnings quality, they focus on how inventory 
accruals affect the earnings quality of their own firms instead of its externalities on 
suppliers. To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate if the inventory accruals of one 
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firm affect the earnings quality of their economically-related counterparties. Second, by 
providing strong and consistent evidences on the causal relatioship between customer’s 
inventory accruals and supplier’s financial reporting quality, we shed light on how 
customer’s inventory accruals extend to other aspects to stock market reaction, in this case, 
financial reporting quality. Third, our findings have important implications to the capital 
market participants. If customer’s inventory accruals level affects supplier firms’ earnings 
quality, our findings are useful to accountants, auditors, investors as well as regulators in 
distinguishing reliable earnings information from less accurate information. Thus, our 
findings can help capital market participants better understand how firms’ business and 
reporting behaviors are affected by accounting information of their downstream customers.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the literature reviews and hypotheses 
development. Section 3 outlines the research designs and section 4 describes the sample.  
In section 5 we discuss the empirical findings. Section 6 demonstrates additional analyses 
and section 7 offers the conclusion.  
 
2. Hypotheses Development and Related Research  
An instrumental paper of Sloan (1996) break down earnings into two components: 
cash flows and total accruals, and the literature has developed to further test the persistence 
of the components of cash flows and different accruals. For inventory accruals, 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) document that firms with low inventory accruals quality 
have more future changes in earnings. In addition, Thomas and Zhang (2002) show that 
the inventory change is the most important cause of accrual anomaly. Allen et al. (2013) 
show that inventory accruals are likely to experience subsequent reversals because of 
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inventory write-downs, which reflect that higher inventory accruals lead to lower 
persistence of earnings. 
Recent literature in operations management indicate that the buildup of excess 
inventory adversely affects firm outcomes in financial performance and stock market 
reaction. For instance, Chen et al. (2005, 2007) and Steinker and Hoberg (2013) establish 
a negative relationship between high inventory level and future stock returns. Likewise, 
Kesavan and Mani (2013) document abnormal inventory growth is associated with poor 
one-year ahead earnings. 
Researchers have recently taken an interest in exploring the influence of customer’s 
corporate behavior on their suppliers. Hendricks and Singhal (2009) show the negative 
impacts of customer’s excess inventory announcement on supplier firm’s stock returns in 
short time windows of one to five days after the announcement. Their paper underscores 
the financial implications of customer’s inventory information to their economically-
related counterparties. Hertzel et al. (2008) document that when customers files for 
bankruptcy, the stock returns of their suppliers are likely to be negative, and Houston, Lin 
and Zhu (2016) demonstrate that a customer’s bankruptcy increases the bank financing 
costs of its major suppliers. Hui et al. (2012) show that when the bargaining power of 
customer is stronger, the supplier meets the demand for accounting conservatism 
recognizes losses more quickly, and vice versa. Overall, prior empirical evidence suggests 
that customer’s corporate behaviors are important actors on supplier’s financial practices, 
as well as accounting policies. 
However, there is no empirical evidence on whether the impacts of customer’s 
inventory accruals exert on their supplier firms’ earnings quality and likelihood of 
earnings misstatement. Prior studies on earnings quality are basically related to accruals 
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quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004). There are two reasons for poor accruals quality. First, 
managers can intentionally manipulate accruals through earnings management. Second, 
managers can unintentionally misestimate accruals because it is hard to predict the future 
or because there are demand shocks due to customer’s inventory write-downs. Both 
reasons have been well studied in the existing literature. From the perspective of earnings 
management, prior studies have documented that managers use “inventory accruals” to 
overstate their earnings (e.g., Thomas and Zhang 2002). For unintentional errors, Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) show that the accruals quality is not only associated with managerial 
opportunism but also systematically related to the volatility of operations, such as absolute 
size of accruals, loss incidence, and the standard deviation of cash flows, accruals, 
earnings, and sales. 
We expect that a high level of customer’s inventory accruals leads to poor supplier’s 
earnings quality because errors in accrual estimation are likely to occur and affect the 
financial reporting quality. These potential errors can be caused by intentional errors, such 
as earnings management, and unintentional errors such as measurement errors. For 
intentional errors, inventory buildups at customers could imply that supplier firms may 
engage in “channel stuffing” or “trade loading,” which could lead to earnings 
management through accelerating revenue recognition and recording receivables sooner 
than justified. For unintentional errors, a higher level of customer’s inventory accruals 
indicates greater uncertainty, more estimation and result in estimation errors, and thus 
lower earnings quality. In the face of confounding signals due to customer’s inventory 
growth, suppliers have inherent difficulty to distinguish between expected future demand 
increases or bloated inventories due to disappointing sales, which increase the uncertainty 
about the future demand and volatility of operations. In case of bloated inventories, 
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supplier firms have less control over magnitude and the speed of inventory reductions. 
The suppliers’ future business prospects are likely related to the actions of customers take, 
such as promotion and sales discount. Such kind of high uncertainty in the operating 
environment increases the tendency of using approximations and estimation, and result in 
higher estimation errors and lower accrual quality. In particular, Allen et al. (2013) show 
that firms with high inventory accruals are more likely to report write-downs of inventory 
in next years. As customer’s inventory write-downs are severe negative shocks to the 
supplier firm's future sales and cash flows, supplier firms are suffered from less stable 
predictable future prospects, therefore, more and larger estimation errors. Hence, if 
customer’s inventory accruals levels allow intentional and unintentional errors in earnings 
estimation to occur, we expect a negative causal relation between customer’s inventory 
accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality.  
Although higher level of customer’s inventory accruals might lead to higher 
supplier’s earnings estimation error, supplier’s information advantage could potentially 
suggest customer’s inventory accruals do not affect supplier’s earnings quality. 
It is generally accepted that the supplier’s information advantage is useful to 
interpret information content about customer’s inventory accruals. First, suppliers gather 
customer private information from the ordinary course of business (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). Suppliers pay close attention to how customers conduct service or deliver goods. 
The order size and frequency could help suppliers to understand customers’ operating 
conditions. The similarity in the line of business activities further empowers suppliers to 
better interpret customer’s statuses and future prospects. For example, Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) show that suppliers provide trade credit even to loss-making firm if the customers 
have good future sales potential. Information advantage theory propose that suppliers are 
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able to interpret the information content of customer’s inventory accruals as well as predict 
future demand and understand industry trends (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). Since 
supplier’s information advantage likely curtail both procedural and estimation errors in 
predicting future cash flows, a high level of customer’s inventory accruals might not result 
in poor supplier’s earnings quality. Moreover, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue that 
information advantage of suppliers is obtained from their input transaction. Distinct from 
other types of lenders, suppliers automatically notify if the customer is carrying out a 
productive activity. Moreover, customers’ payment activities could be directly observed 
by suppliers. If customers fail to reach early payment discount option, it means they do 
not have lower cost alternatives to repay the owing amount and may indicate operating 
problems (Smith, 1987). To extend, imprecise future information signaled by customer’s 
inventory accruals become a clear picture to the suppliers when combined with that their 
existing information set. For example, a high level of customer’s inventory accruals could 
be interpreted as higher future demand when the customer firm implements a productive 
activity and takes advantages of early payment discounts. Thus, a high level of customer’s 
inventory accruals may suggest a more sophisticated management team with good supply 
chain collaboration processes and information sharing with their suppliers. Based on the 
arguments above and extant empirical evidence, we hypothesize that supplier may have 
an information advantage in interpreting the information of customer’s inventory accruals 
and a high customer’s inventory level do not lead to lower financial reporting quality. 
Given the two contrasting views, it remains an empirical question whether customer’s 
inventory accruals affect supplier’s earnings quality. Thus, we establish the following 
hypothesis: 
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Ceteris paribus, higher level of customer’s inventory accruals level does not affect 
supplier’s earnings quality. 
 
3. Research Design  
This section discusses the research designs used to test our hypothesis. To examine 
whether a high level of inventory accruals at downstream customers affects a supplier 
firm’s earnings quality, we consider two commonly used proxies – the standard deviation 
of Dechow and Dichev (2002) residuals and the absolute magnitude of abnormal accruals 
(Francis et al. 2005). To capture the propensity of earnings management, we employ the 
extent of income increasing accruals. 
We utilize the following model to empirically evaluate how customer inventory 
accruals affects earnings quality: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 + ∑𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 +  𝜉𝜉  (1) 
 
where Earnings Quality is proxied by discretionary accrual and accrual quality. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is level of customer’s inventory accruals. We control for other determinants of 
reporting quality and earnings management, described in more detail later. 
The first measure of earnings quality is based on the method developed by Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005).  The rationale of this approach 
is to map accruals into past, present and future operating cash flows and measurement 
error weakens such mapping. With this premise, the standard deviation of this 
measurement error (AQ) represents deteriorating earnings quality in which higher AQ 
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indicates poorer earnings quality. According to Dechow and Dichev (2002), we model the 
measurement error in earnings with the following regression: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (2)  
 
where WA represents working capital accruals, CFO is the cash flows from operations, 
ΔREV is the change in total revenue, and PPE is property, plant and equipment (gross). 
AQ is measured by the standard deviation of residuals, calculated over years t-4 through 
t.1 All variables are deflated by average total assets and winsorized at the 1% level to 
mitigate the effect of extreme values. 
Our second proxy of earnings quality is measured by the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) which is derived from the modified Jones (1991) model. 
The measure is based on the rationale that a firm’s accruals capture both fundamentals 
like changes in revenues and PPE. Thus, the amount that cannot be explained by 
fundamentals can be viewed as abnormal, and high level of abnormal accruals implies low 
earnings quality. To define the level of abnormal accruals, we employ the following model 
by industry-year with at least 20 firm-years in year t.2 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜆𝜆2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (3) 
 
                                                 
1 Accrual quality is the standard deviation of the residuals (𝜀𝜀) over current and past 4 years with at least 4 
observations out of 5 years. 
2 Industries are defined per Fama and French (1997). 
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Total accruals (TA) represents income before extraordinary items less net operating cash 
flows, ΔAR is change in accounts receivable and the remaining variables are defined as 
equation 2. All variables are deflated by average total assets and winsorized at the 1% 
level to mitigate the effect of extreme values. The absolute value of the residual (𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is 
our second proxy of earnings quality. To ensure consistency of interpretation for AQ and 
ABS_DA, higher AQ and ABS_DA imply poorer financial reporting quality.    
  To measure earnings quality, we utilize the error term 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  in equation (3) that 
indicates deviations from expected accruals explained by fundamental operating activities 
of the supplier.  In short, the error term captures the extent of accrual manipulation. In 
addition, we consider only positive errors (labeled as DA> 0), as we are intended to find 
out whether managers exploit income-increasing discretionary accruals to attain financial 
reporting objectives. 
In estimating equation (1), we control for several determinants of earnings quality 
and earnings management following Jiang et al. (2010) and Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006). In particular, we control for supplier’s firm characteristics like firm size (Size), 
firm leverage (LEV), age of the firm (OldFirm), growth opportunities proxied by market 
to book ratio (MB), volatility in operations proxied by volatility of sales growth 
(StdSaleGrwth). Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that earnings quality measures are 
especially sensitive to firm-specific volatility in outcome variables like sales and financial 
performance.  Hence, we control for standard deviation of sales (StdSale) and standard 
deviation of operating cash flows (StdCF). We also include the level of supplier’s 
inventory accruals (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠) in our model. The estimated empirical specification is as 
follows: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼5𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 +  𝜉𝜉                                     (4) 
 
Industry and year fixed effects are captured in the model to control for possible 
differences in industries and economy-wide trends. We predict that the coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 
from equation (4) will be positive (negative) if having high level of customer’s inventory 
accruals is associated with poorer (better) earnings quality and more (less) earnings 
management. 
 
4.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics   
Our dataset includes supply chain pairs listed in Compustat Segment database 
during the years 1977-2016. Our primary variable of interest is the customer’s inventory 
accruals. Since a supplier can have multiple customers, we employ supply chain sales 
weighted average to aggregate variables from customers (Patatoukas, 2012). We calculate 
the weighted customers’ inventory accruals (𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐) as follow: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
× 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is supply chain sales from supplier i to customer j; n is the number of 
customers in year t; and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is inventory accruals of customer j in year t. 
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Following prior studies, we exclude the customer firms from financial industry (i.e. sic 
code 6000 – 6999). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables utilized in the empirical 
specifications (Appendix 1 reports detailed variable definitions). Although our dataset is 
extracted from Compustat Segment database which is different from prior literature, the 
mean and median of the earnings quality proxies do not deviate very much from those in 
prior literature (e.g. Hopkins et al., 2015). 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix which reveals interesting clues about the 
relation between customer’s inventory accruals (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐) and earnings quality proxies. 
First, w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is positively correlated with both AQ and ABS_DA, suggesting that 
suppliers with high level of customers’ inventory accruals experience lower earnings 
quality (i.e., higher AQ and ABS_DA). Second, w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is positively correlated with 
Positive_DA implying that firms with high level of customers’ inventory accruals may 
have greater tendency to manage earnings upwards to attain earnings targets, an indication 
of intentional estimation error. 
Although these results suggest a higher level of customers’ inventory accruals 
leads to suppliers’ lower earnings quality and more earnings management, our dependent 
variable w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is correlated with fundamental characteristics like size (SIZE) and 
age (OldFirm). Thus, we turn next to the multivariate analysis. 
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5. Empirical Findings  
5.1. Main Results  
Table 3 demonstrates the empirical results for the relationship between the 
weighted customers’ inventory accruals (w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐) and our measures of earnings 
quality. Column (1) shows the findings of assessing equation (4) utilizing AQ as the proxy 
for earnings quality. The coefficient on w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is positive and significant (𝛼𝛼1 = 
0.033, p < 0.01), implying that firms with a higher level of customers’ inventory accruals 
have lower accrual quality. In column (2) we find consistent results in which 
w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 is positively related to higher absolute discretionary accruals (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.053, 
p < 0.01). The results are appealing to the errors in accrual estimation hypothesis. The 
evidence does not support that supplier have information advantage to interpret 
customer’s inventory information. In economic terms, these results suggest that when the 
level of customer’s inventory accruals is increased by 1 unit, AQ and ABS_DA is 
approximately increased by 52% and 82% respectively, measured at the median of the 
distribution of these variables.3 Results presented in column (3) test the association of 
customer’s inventory accruals on their firms’ earnings management practices. The 
coefficient of w_  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐  is positive but insignificant. The results are similar to 
preliminary findings of the univariate correlations in Table 1.  
Since supplier may not incorporate the customer inventory information into the 
financial reporting practice in the same fiscal year, we re-examine model (1) – (3) using 
                                                 
3 In Table 1, the median of AQ is 0.063. The coefficient on the customer inventory accruals (w_INVACCc) 
in Table 3 is 0.033. When w_abi is increased by 0.01 unit, there is a 0.52% increase in AQ [(0.033/0.063) 
* 0.01]. For ABS_DA, the median is 0.065. The coefficient on the customer inventory accruals in Table 3 
is 0.053, representing a 0.82% increase [(0.053/0.065) * 0.01]. 
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one-year lead dependent variables. Results in column (4) – (5) are generally consistent 
with previous findings. The coefficient of w_  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 in column (6) becomes 
statistically significant (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.069, p < 0.01). Supplier with a higher level of customers’ 
inventory accruals is associated with higher level of income-increasing discretionary 
accruals in year t+1. As with the tests on earnings quality of supplier, the result is 
consistent with errors in accruals hypothesis. 
5.2 Robustness Tests  
In this section, we investigate if the results reported in Table 3 are robust to 
alternative design choices. Even though we control for related firm characteristics that 
determine earnings quality, there yet may be characteristics that we have omitted. Further, 
the customer’s inventory accruals could be endogenously determined. We address each of 
these issues in turn. 
 
5.2.1 Changes in the level customer’s inventory accruals 
First, we address the issue of omitted variables by conducting an analysis using 
changes specification. Specifically, we only retain observations in which the level of 
customers’ inventory accruals changes (increasing inventory accruals or decreasing 
inventory accruals between time t and time t+1) and re-estimate equation (4) using change 
specification. Thus, the firm acts as its own control, and the coefficient of change in 
weighted customers’ inventory accruals (ch_ w_  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 ) captures the change in 
supplier’s earnings quality due to the change in customer’s inventory accruals. Results 
reported in Table 4 are generally consistent with previous findings. The coefficient of 
ch_w_  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐  in the ch_ABS_DA regression is positively significant (𝛼𝛼1  = 0.069, 
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p<0.1). The coefficient of ch_w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐  in the ch_AQ regression is also positive and 
significant.  
 
5.2.2 Instrumental Variables  
Since having customer with different level of inventory accruals might be a choice 
variable, endogeneity is a potential concern. To solve the problem, we conduct an 
instrumental variables approach (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). We use customer’s 
operational efficiency, measured by industry-adjusted inventory turnover, as the 
instrumental variable. It has two important features as an instrument. First, Lee and 
Kesavan (2018) find that it is correlated with our variable of interest (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐), as firms 
with higher operational efficiency have a lower probability of inventory buildup. Second, 
it is unlikely that the operations management of the downstream customer affects the 
accounting practices of the supplier firm. Hence, it exhibits appealing properties of a valid 
instrument: exogeneity and a strong correlation with the variables of interest.  
To implement the instrumental variables approach, we estimate the first-stage 
OLS regression as follow:  
 
𝑆𝑆_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼5𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼9𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄ℎ_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (5) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the supply chain sales weighted inventory turnovers. 
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Inventory needs in different industries can be quite different. Accordingly, we 
follow Chen et al. (2005,2007) and Hutton et al. (2012) to take the normalized deviation 
from the industry mean to define whether a firm has superior operational efficiency or 
fall behind. To illustrate, it is the normalized cost of goods sold to inventory ratio (i.e. [IT 
– industry mean of IT]/ industry standard deviation of IT). The remaining variables is 
defined as previous equations.  
An advantage of using 𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is unit free. The interpretation of 𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is simple. 
If 𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is positive, customers of firm i in year t are more efficient than their competitors 
in the same industry on average, and vice versa. 
Using the predicted values from equation (5), we estimate the following 
specification:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑂𝑂𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼8𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄ℎ_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 +
𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (6) 
 
The variable of interest (𝑆𝑆_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖]) is the predicted value from 
equation (5) and represents the exogenous portion of customers’ inventory accruals.  
  Table 5 tabulates the results of the instrumental variables tests. We expect the 
exogenous instrument, w_ait, loads negatively in the first stage, indicating that the level 
of customers’ inventory accruals is decreasing with their operational efficiency. Results 
19 
 
of the second-stage estimation presented in columns (2) indicate that inferences are 
consistent with those drawn from Table 3.   
 
5.3 Alternative Proxy for Customer’s Inventory Accruals  
Since the inventory valuation method can be different across companies, we adjust the 
inventory number by including the change of last-in-first-out reserve (lifr) in our 
inventory accruals measure. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
Δinvt𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + Δlifr𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
Consistent with previous practices, we aggregate the variables from customers (including 
AINVACCc) using supply chain sales weighted average when suppliers have multiple 
customers. 
Table 6 examine the relation between adjusted inventory accruals (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐) of 
customer and proxies of supplier’s earnings quality. The results show that suppliers with 
higher AINVACC tend to have lower earnings quality. The coefficients on AINVACC are 
positive and significant (coefficient = 0.027 and 0.048 and p-value <0.05, <0.01 
respectively) when explaining future AQ and ABS_DA. The coefficient of 𝑆𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 
for Positive_DA becomes significant when explaining future Positive_DA at t+1. These 
results are generally consistent with previous findings and support the errors in accrual 
estimation hypothesis rather than informational advantage hypothesis. 
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5.4 Summary  
  Overall, these tests establish a significant negative causal relation between 
customer’s inventory accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality.  When customers 
firms accumulate a high level of inventory accruals, suppliers face more difficulty in 
earnings estimation and tend to engage in upwards earnings management. Our inferences 
are robust to change specifications and different measures of customer’s inventory 
accruals. Moreover, our robust instrumental variable (IV) analysis proposes a causal 
interpretation of the impact of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s earnings 
quality instead of a reverse relation. 
 
6. Additional Analyses  
6.1. Does the Customer’s Inventory Accruals increase the Likelihood of Misstatements?  
  The findings thus far suggest there is a negative causal relation between 
customer’s inventory accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality. Now, we investigate 
the impact of customer’s inventory accruals level on the likelihood of misstatements of 
supplier firms. Many accounting researchers use restatements, SEC Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and internal control weakness reported under 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as the external indicators of earnings misstatements, either 
for unintentional errors or intentional earnings management. Disadvantages of using 
AAERs include selection bias and small sample sizes. Meanwhile, there are problems 
with differentiating between intentional and unintentional errors using restatements and 
SOX firms sample. Thus, Dechow et al. (2011) demonstrate that financial statement 
information is useful for detecting earnings management and introduce a composite 
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measure of the probability of manipulation (F-score) to detect the likelihood of financial 
misstatements. To elaborate, F-Score (fscore) is a scaled logistic probability measure that 
utilize the characteristics of misstatements firms such as accrual quality, financial 
performance, off-balance sheet information, nonfinancial measures, and market-based 
measures to predict future misstatements. If suppliers with high level of customers’ 
inventory accruals have a higher propensity to misstate their financial statements, these 
firms result in higher fscore. 
 Table 7 column (1) presents the results of relation between the level of customers’ 
inventory accruals (w_INVACCc) and suppliers’ F-Score. The coefficient on w_INVACCc 
is positively significant (coefficient = 0.97 and p<0.01). This indicates a higher level of 
customers’ inventory accruals increases the probability of misstatements of supplier firms. 
Column (2) is the results of the estimation of the tendency of suppliers reporting internal 
control weakness (ICW) in year t or t+1. The sample period is from 2004 to 2016 for 
column (2) analysis since the SOX 404 became effective in 2004. Due to the sample 
period restriction, the number of observations is reduced to 6,153. The coefficient on 
w_INVACCc is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 3.98, p<0.05). It implies 
that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory accruals tend to report material 
weakness in current or next year.  
 
6.2   Does Supplier’s Inventory Accruals Influence their Earnings Quality?  
  Our inference that inventory accruals engender inferior financial reporting quality 
and greater earnings management is predicated on the potential errors inherent in 
estimating inventory accruals. Extant research (Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Allen et al., 
2013) document that inventory accruals lead to lower persistence of earnings. Therefore, 
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it is not inconceivable that supplier’s own inventory accruals, instead of customer’s 
inventory accruals, affects the incidence and magnitude of earnings estimation errors, 
thereby resulting in lower earnings quality.   
To test this conjecture, we compare and correlate the customer’s inventory 
accruals and supplier’s own inventory changes. 
          Table 2 reports the correlations between general supplier’s own (INVACCs) and 
their customer’s inventory accruals (INVACCc). The correlations indicate that supplier’s 
inventory accruals are highly correlated with those of their customer (corr = 0.17, p<0.01). 
This suggests that (i) the role of inventory accruals for earnings quality documented is 
likely to propagate along the supply chain, (ii) the impact of customer’s inventory accruals 
on their supplier’s earnings quality could be explained by the supplier’s own inventory 
accrual level.  
 Table 8 tabulates results from regression results of the relationship between the 
firm’s own inventory accruals and reporting outcomes. In estimating the regressions, we 
estimate equation (4) by adding the control variable for the firm’s inventory accruals 
(INVACCs), customer concentration (rank_cc), average supply chain relationship 
duration (avg_duration) and operating cycle (operating_cycle). Results are broadly 
consistent with both the firm’s and their customer’s inventory accruals affect earnings 
quality. Our findings indicate that the effects of customer’s inventory accruals are 
incrementally significant on supplier’s earnings quality after controlling for the supplier’s 
own inventory accruals. We also find that the firm’s own inventory accruals level is 
positively associated with its absolute value of discretionary accruals (coefficient = 
0.0056) and accruals quality (coefficient = 0.029) and the coefficient in the earnings 
quality regression does not reach conventional significance levels. With respect to 
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likelihood of accounting misstatements, we document that the firm’s own inventory level 
is positively related to the F-Score and the relationship is statistically strong.  Together, 
the evidence suggests that customer’s inventory accruals is an external determinant of the 
supplier’s earnings quality which is incremental to the firm’s own inventory accruals 
documented.  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper examines how the level of customer’s inventory accruals affects 
supplier’s financial reporting, specifically the role they play in firms’ accounting quality 
and earnings management.  We consider two contrasting hypotheses towards the effects 
of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s earnings quality. First, we consider a high 
level of customer’s inventory accruals allows international and unintentional errors in 
earnings estimation to occur and there is a neagtive relation between customer’s inventory 
accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality. Second, we consider supplier may have 
inherent informational advantages when processing the customer inventory information. 
Based on informational advantage hypothesis, customer’s inventory accruals level is 
unrelated to supplier’s earnings quality. Our findings indicate that customer’s inventory 
accruals level is negatively associated with supplier’s earnings quality. In additional tests, 
we employ alternative measures to capture the differences in inventory recording methods 
and the results are consistent to the main analysis.  
Taken as a whole, the results are not favor with supplier’s information advantage 
hypothesis, at least with respect to accounting quality and earnings management decisions. 
Rather, high level of customer’s inventory accruals adversely affects supplier’s financial 
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reporting quality. Our results are robust to change base analysis using the observations 
with changing inventory holding practices and adding change specifications to the model. 
Moreover, we also use different indicators of earnings quality including F-Score (Dechow 
et al., 2011) and internal control weakness. Furthermore, our results are robust when 
additional control variables such as supplier’s own inventory accruals, customer 
concentration, average supply chain relationship duration and operating cycle are included. 
All the findings are broadly consistent with our main results which support the errors in 
accrual estimation hypothesis. 
Our paper contributes to the literature about inventory accruals externality along 
the supply chain and the determinates of earnings quality. To our knowledge, we are 
among the first to address the adverse effect of customer’s inventory accruals level on 
their supplier’s earnings quality and likelihood of financial misstatements. Second, we 
shed light on how customer’s inventory accruals level extends to other aspects to stock 
market reaction, in this case, accounting practices. Third, our evidence has important 
implications to the investing community. If customer’s inventory accruals level affects 
supplier firms’ earnings quality, our evidences are useful to capital market participants in 
distinguishing between reliable earnings information and inaccurate earnings information. 
Specifically, this study extends and develops the understanding on the influence of 
inventory accruals on earnings quality along the supply chain.  
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Appendix 1 
Variable Definitions  
  
Variable  Variable Definition  
 
w_INVACCc customer’s supply chain sales weighted inventory accruals; inventory 
accruals is defined as change in inventory for year t-1 to year t deflated 
by average total assets; 
AQ  accruals quality estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals of a 
modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) over the current and previous 4 years;  
ABS_DA  absolute value of discretionary accruals from a modified Jones (1991) 
model;  
Positive_DA positive discretionary accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model, 0 
or negative discretionary are considered as missing value 
SIZE  log of market value of equity;  
LEV  total long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at);  
MB  market to book equity ratio;  
StdSaleGrwth  standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous 4 
years;  
StdSale  standard deviation of sales over the current and previous 4 years;  
StdCF  standard deviation of cash flows from operations (oancf) scaled by total 
assets (at) over the current and previous 4 years;  
OldFirm  Indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm is listed on Compustat for 
more than 20 years, equals to 0 otherwise;  
fscore  F-Score developed by Dechow et al. (2011) 
ICW = 1 when the firm reports internal control weakness at year t or year 
t+1 
avg_duration average duration of supplier-customer relationship in Compustat 
Segment database; 
rank_cc decile rank of customer concentration (cc), 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ (
𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
)2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the supply chain sales from customer j to supplier i at 
time t; 
ABIs inventory accruals of supplier which is calculated as change of 
inventory from year t-1 to year t deflated by average total assets 
w_ait customer’s supply chain sales weighted abnormal inventory turnover; 
abnormal inventory turnover is defined as [(IT – industry mean of IT)/ 
industry standard deviation of IT] where IT is inventory turnover (cost 
of goods sold to inventory ratio) 
AINVACCc customer’s supply chain sales weighted adjusted inventory accruals; 
adjusted inventory accruals is defined as [(Δinvt +Δlifr) / average total 
asset], where Δinvt is change of inventory and Δlifr is change in last-in-
first-out reserve of inventory from year t-1 to year t 
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    Table 1 Descriptive Statistics  
  
This table provides descriptive statistics and correlations for 9,768 firm-years. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1 
                                                                                                  
avg_duration                 9768     4.820265            4     4.098264            2            6
rank_cc                      9768     .5321663           .5     .2824285           .3           .8
OldFirm                      9768     .3516585            0     .4775124            0            1
ABIs                         9768     .0263468     .0085103     .0582517            0      .043592
sd of cash flow              9768     .0921718     .0622938     .1036413     .0364486     .1066742
sd of sales                  9768     158.6124     22.51129     435.6631     6.006624     91.65877
sd of sales growth           9768     .2285443     .1604383     .2344034     .0842229     .2822674
MB                           9768     2.943373     1.697309      4.47993     1.016719     3.057346
LEV                          9768      .172336     .1225799     .1827923     .0026362      .286606
SIZE                         9768     4.856391     4.793318     2.304314     3.139072     6.496804
fscore                       9768     1.087922     .9250701     .7821753     .5207914     1.416282
AQ                           9768     .0627237     .0462406     .0542824     .0276799      .077507
Positive_DA                  9768     .0643658     .0422383     .0710306     .0177203     .0836792
ABS_DA                       9768     .0645361     .0422383      .071992     .0177203     .0836792
w_INVACCc                    9768     .0115957     .0047459     .0319648    -.0020232     .0196538
                                                                                                  
                            count         mean          p50           sd          p25          p75
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                                                                                                                         
OldFirm            -0.0201**     -0.122***    -0.123***    -0.170***   -0.0669***     0.202***    0.0306***   -0.0925***    -0.126***     0.121***    -0.192***   -0.0783***         1   
ABIs                 0.170***     0.357***     0.361***     0.101***     0.491***   -0.0858***    0.0332***    0.0129       0.0948***   -0.0518***    0.0603***         1                
sd of cash flow    -0.0103        0.357***     0.355***     0.563***    0.0950***    -0.297***    -0.184***     0.301***     0.395***    -0.152***         1                             
sd of sales        -0.0444***    -0.122***    -0.123***    -0.131***   -0.0185*       0.518***     0.120***    0.0142      -0.0210**          1                                          
sd of sales gr~h    0.0187*       0.319***     0.319***     0.478***     0.231***    -0.320***    -0.150***    0.0920***         1                                                       
MB                 0.00442        0.154***     0.151***     0.248***    0.0845***     0.156***    0.0519***         1                                                                    
LEV               -0.00556      -0.0834***   -0.0838***    -0.165***  0.000452        0.170***         1                                                                                 
SIZE               -0.0450***    -0.285***    -0.287***    -0.286***   -0.0625***         1                                                                                              
fscore               0.128***     0.412***     0.412***     0.233***         1                                                                                                           
AQ                 0.00928        0.480***     0.478***         1                                                                                                                        
Positive_DA         0.0556***     0.999***         1                                                                                                                                     
ABS_DA              0.0557***         1                                                                                                                                                  
w_INVACCc                1                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                 w_INVACCc       ABS_DA    Positiv~A           AQ       fscore         SIZE          LEV           MB    sd of s~h    sd of s~s    sd of c~w         ABIs      OldFirm   
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Table 3 Relation between Customer’s Weighted Invetory Accruals and Proxies of 
Earnings Quality  
  
This table reports OLS estimation of the association between customer’s supply chain 
weighted average abnormal inventory (w_ABIc) and proxies of earnings quality and 
reporting quality over the period 1977–2016. Models (1) – (3) are estimated using 
variables at fiscal year t, whereas we use one year ahead dependent variable in models (4) 
– (6). All variables are defined in the appendix. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses.4 
 
 
  
  
                                                 
4 For the models in column (4) – (6), we only keep the observations in which the firm maintain supply 
chain relationship in both fiscal year t and year t+1. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes   
Segment_dummies               Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .4455527         .193784        .3106762        .4389906        .1684687        .1904804   
N                           22706           22921           11303           17274           17335            8459   
                                                                                                                    
                        (.006531)         (.0189)      (.0209245)      (.0060591)      (.0151683)      (.0232707)   
ABIs                      .003387        .0217182         .410311***    -.0093522        .0445234***     .0631731***
                       (.0009795)      (.0012473)      (.0011897)      (.0010537)      (.0016105)      (.0014782)   
OldFirm                 -.0018451*      -.0020208        .0012746       -.0017426       -.0028687*      -.0004299   
                       (.0097546)      (.0133687)      (.0134771)       (.010282)      (.0135021)      (.0133229)   
sd of cash flow          .1907574***     .1344606***     .1329247***     .1804318***      .083985***     .0783931***
                       (7.18e-07)      (8.93e-07)      (1.28e-06)      (8.40e-07)      (1.11e-06)      (1.61e-06)   
sd of sales              5.10e-07        3.73e-06***     2.78e-06**      1.15e-06        4.40e-06***     2.29e-06   
                       (.0046354)      (.0042697)      (.0053324)      (.0047239)       (.004867)      (.0058625)   
sd of sales growth       .0579882***     .0496265***     .0402068***      .056988***     .0430866***     .0391995***
                       (.0001352)      (.0001903)      (.0002376)      (.0001538)      (.0002476)      (.0003532)   
MB                       .0010957***     .0013533***     .0013933***     .0012666***     .0016011***     .0021369***
                       (.0026469)      (.0026988)      (.0034985)      (.0027043)      (.0039928)      (.0050192)   
LEV                     -.0015067       -.0090499***    -.0017796       -.0054222*       -.015824***    -.0250398***
                       (.0003267)      (.0003587)      (.0004168)       (.000366)      (.0004492)       (.000527)   
SIZE                    -.0034588***    -.0052867***    -.0055986***     -.003636***    -.0065591***    -.0061873***
                       (.0104288)      (.0165276)      (.0213329)      (.0120411)      (.0213075)      (.0211716)   
w_INVACCc                .0331967***     .0527304***     .0106511        .0447887***     .0419721*       .0691075***
                                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                               AQ          ABS_DA     Positive_DA         AQ[t+1]     ABS_DA[t+1]    Positive_~1]   
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Table 4 Relation between Changes of Customer’s Weighted Abnormal Inventory 
and Proxies of Earnings Quality  
  
This table reports estimation of the relation between changes of customer weighted abnormal 
inventory and changes of proxies of earnings quality over the period 1977-2016. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
 
 
    
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes             Yes   
Segment_dummies               Yes             Yes   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .0205285        .1449969   
N                            4811            4798   
                                                    
                       (.0296862)      (.0081595)   
ch_ABIs                 -.0529526*      -.0295873***
                        (.003993)      (.0019605)   
ch_OldFirm               .0057442         .002471   
                       (.0379599)      (.0137945)   
ch_StdCF                 .1442697***     .1617302***
                       (4.59e-06)      (1.08e-06)   
ch_StdSale               3.33e-06       -1.53e-06   
                       (.0163553)      (.0051779)   
ch_StdSaleGrwth          .0116868        .0362875***
                       (.0007372)       (.000265)   
ch_MB                    .0028949***     .0007152** 
                       (.0086586)      (.0032756)   
ch_LEV                   .0040789        .0040368   
                       (.0026951)      (.0010066)   
ch_SIZE                 -.0058758**     -.0005391   
                        (.034136)      (.0114731)   
ch_w_INVACCc             .0609049*       .0195961*  
                                                    
                             b/se            b/se   
                        ch_ABS_DA           ch_AQ   
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Table 5 IV 
We use operational efficiency of customer (i.e. supply chain sales weighted industry 
adjusted inventory turnover) as an instrumental variable for customer abnormal 
inventory. 
 
  
    
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes             Yes   
Segment_dummies               Yes             Yes   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .0991496        .1849137   
N                           22842           22395   
                                                    
                       (.0012584)                   
constant                 .0093501***                
                       (.0077786)      (.0204462)   
ABIs                     .0409787***     .0147623   
                        (.000644)      (.0012419)   
OldFirm                  .0003331       -.0019125   
                       (.0033088)      (.0133251)   
sd of cash flow         -.0112016***     .1362975***
                       (5.55e-07)      (9.68e-07)   
sd of sales             -8.04e-07        3.86e-06***
                       (.0016616)      (.0043939)   
sd of sales growth       .0028646*       .0495995***
                       (.0000673)      (.0001969)   
MB                       .0001696**       .001312***
                       (.0016482)       (.002816)   
LEV                     -.0030821*      -.0081626***
                       (.0002025)      (.0003662)   
SIZE                     .0003057       -.0053058***
                                       (.1288431)   
w_INVACCc                                .2682826** 
                       (.0011877)                   
w_ait                   -.0124946***                
                                                    
                             b/se            b/se   
                     first stag~)      IV(ABS_DA)   
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Table 6 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Proxies of Earnings Quality 
(Using an Alternate Proxy for Abnormal inventory 
  
Results of OLS estimation of the relation between alternative metrics and proxies of earnings 
quality. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
  
Adjusted Inventory Accrual (AABIc) 
 
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes              No   
Segment_dummies               Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes              No   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .4457374        .1920991        .3064132        .2648558               .   
N                           19977           20151            9893           17806            5253   
                                                                                                    
                       (.0070705)      (.0202662)      (.0227148)      (.1864922)       (1.44165)   
ABIs                     .0072133        .0187566        .4117754***     4.696057***     .2551008   
                       (.0010515)      (.0013386)      (.0013106)      (.0163508)      (.1939758)   
OldFirm                 -.0018825*      -.0021446        .0010984        .0353714**     -.0464677   
                       (.0102295)       (.014886)      (.0156691)      (.0882245)      (.5711907)   
sd of cash flow          .1934512***     .1364635***     .1346958***    -.0298734          .53729   
                       (8.15e-07)      (1.05e-06)      (1.44e-06)      (.0000186)       (.000152)   
sd of sales              7.37e-07        4.17e-06***     2.74e-06*       6.37e-06        4.73e-06   
                       (.0048062)      (.0045877)      (.0056815)      (.0432547)      (.3581138)   
sd of sales growth       .0597333***     .0518248***     .0413537***     .3902175***     .6578839*  
                       (.0001384)      (.0002007)      (.0002545)      (.0020154)      (.0094092)   
MB                       .0011396***     .0013778***     .0013765***     .0024908       -.0040328   
                       (.0027873)      (.0030694)      (.0041233)      (.0512286)      (.3593054)   
LEV                     -.0011587       -.0091044***    -.0028273        .2871451***     .9781354***
                       (.0003493)      (.0003912)      (.0004454)      (.0046316)      (.0646841)   
SIZE                    -.0035346***    -.0053568***    -.0055545***     .0137032***     -.279462***
                       (.0105367)       (.016808)      (.0221461)      (.2197477)      (1.700942)   
w_ABIc                   .0269868**      .0475483***     .0084236        .8173253***      2.26027   
main                                                                                                
                                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                               AQ          ABS_DA     Positive_DA          fscore             ICW   
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Table 7 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Earnings Quality (F-score and 
ICW) 
  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
  
 
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes              No   
Segment_dummies               Yes              No   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .2642451               .   
N                           20206            6153   
                                                    
                       (.1716032)      (1.228417)   
ABIs                      4.70076***     .4167528   
                       (.0150913)      (.1702283)   
OldFirm                   .035513**     -.0685489   
                       (.0790948)      (.5448921)   
sd of cash flow         -.0638847        .5659792   
                        (.000017)      (.0001385)   
sd of sales              3.03e-06        .0000594   
                       (.0430695)      (.3530876)   
sd of sales growth       .4183584***     .5834658*  
                       (.0020518)      (.0089555)   
MB                       .0025857       -.0022784   
                       (.0479931)      (.3783774)   
LEV                      .3082972***     .7854664** 
                       (.0046464)      (.0593769)   
SIZE                     .0170669***    -.2955507***
                       (.2036407)      (1.865841)   
w_INVACCc                .9714677***     3.980367** 
main                                                
                                                    
                             b/se            b/se   
                           fscore             ICW   
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Table 8 Additional Control Variables 
 
 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
                                                                                    
Year_dummies                  Yes             Yes             Yes              No   
Segment_dummies               Yes             Yes             Yes              No   
Cluster                Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year      Firm, year   
r2_a                     .4681747         .211842        .2952408               .   
N                           19977           20188           17727            5247   
                                                                                    
                       (.0010692)      (.0014514)      (.0154239)      (.1000582)   
operating_cycle          .0096686***     .0163768***     .2006007***     .1613136   
                       (.0001212)      (.0001317)      (.0020641)      (.0152725)   
avg_duration            -.0003196**     -.0001247        .0067691***     .0193833   
                       (.0017553)      (.0023051)      (.0264479)       (.211775)   
rank_cc                  .0028441        .0064288***    -.0814632***     .1865255   
                        (.006064)      (.0182515)      (.1608205)      (1.110245)   
ABIs                     .0047915        .0237332        4.706869***      .249356   
                       (.0009886)       (.001252)      (.0145964)      (.1756445)   
OldFirm                  -.001317       -.0017098       -.0028208       -.2028876   
                       (.0100436)      (.0151601)      (.0913979)      (.5932976)   
sd of cash flow          .2000213***     .1482494***    -.0241019        1.551529***
                       (7.63e-07)      (9.23e-07)       (.000017)      (.0001371)   
sd of sales              9.11e-07        4.12e-06***     4.91e-06        .0000804   
                       (.0045119)      (.0041269)      (.0409972)      (.3970299)   
sd of sales growth        .061683***     .0544287***     .4151371***     .3617812   
                       (.0001448)      (.0001834)      (.0024674)      (.0116494)   
MB                        .001016***     .0012215***     .0012183       -.0108666   
                       (.0028647)      (.0028486)      (.0513038)      (.4330578)   
LEV                     -.0004935       -.0081933***     .3503609***     .8480452*  
                       (.0003174)      (.0003799)      (.0048722)      (.0587439)   
SIZE                    -.0031589***    -.0044687***     .0132725***    -.2914286***
                       (.0109645)      (.0163672)      (.2070916)      (1.898461)   
w_INVACCc                .0230095**      .0418633**      .7305971***      3.58018*  
main                                                                                
                                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se   
                               AQ          ABS_DA          fscore             ICW   
                                                                                    
